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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the feasibility of Prime Vendor Support 
(PVS) for the M3P machine gun, a major subsystem of the Avenger air defense platform.  
Research will include a review of the current M3P support concept, an in -depth study of 
PVS and examples of where PVS is being implemented, and the advantages and 
disadvantages of support through PVS.  The objective of this thesis is to provide 
managers a background and point of departure when considering PVS in their life-cycle 
support strategy decisions.   
B. BACKGROUND 
The U.S. Army’s Avenger air defense system is designed to counter aerial threats 
such as attack helicopters, cruise missiles, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and low -
level fixed-wing aircraft.  The system integrates an electrically driven, gyro -stabilized, 
missile-firing turret on the rear of a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 
(HMMWV).  The firing turret incorporates eight STINGER missiles (in two launch pods) 
with a .50 caliber machine gun (M3P) for close-in aircraft and ground attack protection.  
The fire control suite includes a forward-looking infrared (FLIR) sensor, laser 
rangefinder, heads-up optical sight and fire control computer.   
Boeing’s Avenger won the U.S. Army’s Pedestal Mounted Stinger (PMS) Non -
Developmental Item (NDI) competition and began full-scale production in 1990.  Over 
1000 fire units have been delivered to the Army, Army National Guard, and Marine 
Corps.  Additional fire units have been sold via Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Taiwan 
and Egypt.1  The Avenger is currently in service at select locations in the United States 
and abroad as depicted in Figure 2. 
                                          
1 [http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/space/md/avenger/], 29 July 2002. 
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Figure 2.   U.S. Army Avenger Fielded Locations.  
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Question 
· How might a PVS program be implemented for the U.S. Army’s Avenger 
M3P machine gun system? 
2. Subsidiary Questions 
· What is the purpose of the Avenger weapon system and the M3P machine 
gun subsystem?  
· What are the attributes of the M3P, where is it fielded, and what is the 
logistic support strategy? 
· What is prime vendor suppor t (PVS) and what are some examples of PVS 
in operation? 
· What are the advantages and disadvantages of supporting the M3P through 
PVS? 
· What conclusions and recommendations might be drawn from this case 
study, regarding application of PVS to weapons subsystems used by the 
Army or other services? 
D. SCOPE OF THESIS 
This thesis will be a general study of PVS and will consider the advantages and 
disadvantages of PVS for the M3P.  The point of the study is to examine PVS programs 
around the DoD and “think outside the box” for the Avenger crew and repairman.  The 
primary point of consideration is the most direct link (or links) to the source (or sources) 
for spare parts and technical expertise.  This study will look at PVS examples, examine 
the advantages and disadvantages, and consider peacetime and wartime environments.  
This thesis will not be a detailed, Logistic Support Analysis (LSA), or attempt to provide 
a detailed cost study between the current support history and the proposed concept, 
although the savings is expected to be substantial.  This thesis will be limited to support 
of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps M3Ps only.  FMS sales of Avengers and the 
associated support requirements of their M3Ps will not be considered, although a direct 
PVS concept may be des irable.  
E.  METHODOLOGY   
This thesis will first examine the current support concept for the M3P by 
interviewing key people at the Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM), the Army 
Materiel Command (AMC), the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and users at selected 
4 
locations.  The interviews will result in a summarization of the support tasks, the 
organizations involved, the time line, the geographical locations, and current support 
issues.  Next, there will be a study of PVS in general and examples of PVS in both 
commercial and defense sectors.  The analysis will continue with a comparison of the 
advantages and disadvantages of PVS for the M3P.  Sources will include web searches, 
local commercial and military interviews, DoD publications, information from the NPS 
and other libraries, and interviews with the prime contractor.  Interviews will include 
questions regarding spare part stocks (both on-hand and central warehousing), delivery, 
surge requirements, technical support (both on -site and remote), training, manuals, depot 
support (facilities, shipment, turn-around), special tools, and emergency/contingency 
operations.  The PVS interview questions will be developed from the subsidiary 
questions in this thesis, as well as relevant questions derived from the intervie w 
discussions.   
F. ORGANIZATION 
· Chapter I will provide an introduction to this thesis, to include the 
purpose, background, research questions, scope, methodology, 
organization, and benefits of the study  
· Chapter II will describe the attributes of the M3P, its geographical 
locations, and the current support concept  
· Chapter III will be a case study of PVS, including examples where PVS 
has been implemented 
· Chapter IV will describe the advantages and disadvantages of PVS for the 
M3P 
· Chapter V will draw conclusions and recommendations of PVS 
application for the M3P and other weapons subsystems used by the Army 
or other services  
G. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This case study could be the basis for a performance-based contract scope of work 
for PVS of the Avenger M3P mac hine gun system.  The primary beneficiary of this study 
will be the SHORAD Project Office, should an alternate support concept be adopted.  
Additionally, other systems in DoD, that may have similarly unique subsystems or 
components, may use this study to s treamline their support requirements. 
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II. THE M3P, CURRENT SUPPORT CONCEPT AND ISSUES 
A. THE M3P 
The M3P .50 caliber machine gun system is a high rate-of-fire, single barrel, 
recoil-operated, electrically fired machine gun based on the AN -M3 class of Browning-
designed guns.  The M3P is manufactured by Fabrique Nationale Herstal (FNH) in 
Belgium and was chosen by Boeing to meet the requirements for their PMS proposal.  
When the Army selected Boeing’s proposal, the M3P came with it due to the nature of 
the NDI acquisition.  
 
 
Figure 3.   The Avenger M3P .50 Caliber Machine Gun System.  
(ammunition box removed)  
 
The Avenger machine gun is a system, consisting of the gun, the mounting system 
(an elastic, spring-loaded cradle forward and an adjustable aft mount for bore-sighting), 
an electric remote charger, a flexible feed chute, an ammunition box, and a catch -tray for 
spent ammunition cartridges and links.  Additionally, there is an environmental cover to 
protect the gun from blowing sand, dust, and dirt.  The Avenger fire-control computer has 
unique software to aim and fire the gun, using the gyro-stabilized turret and elevation 
drives, and information from the laser range finder.  The Avenger M3P fires at a nominal 
rate of 1025 +/- 75 rounds per minute (rpm) and the basic load is normally 200 rounds of 
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.50 caliber ammunition.  The gun system is normally fired in automatic mode, which 
restricts each burst to 25 rounds.  The normal peacetime training routine for the M3P has 
been 200-400 rounds per gun, per year, with 200 rounds minimum per crew to be 
qualified.  The Avengers were deployed during Desert Storm and in the Balkans, but no 
data could be found regarding the usage of the M3P.      
B. THE CURRENT SUPPORT CONCEPT 
Two levels of maintenance, organizational and depot, currently support the M3P.  
Most of the maintenance tasks are accomplished at the organizational level by the 
Avenger operator (MOS 14S) and the Avenger repairman (MOS 27T).2  The 
organizational level includes regular cleaning, lubrication, and inspection by the 14S 
operator, as well as installing the gun, bore-sighting procedures, loading ammunition, and 
clearing minor jams.3  The Avenger repairman is trained to completely disassemble the 
gun, diagnose and replace broken parts, examine parts for noticeable wear patterns, and 
gage some parts for service life.  The support concept includes round -dependent 
maintenance for many parts as a preventative measure to avoid sudden breakage and 
subsequent collateral damage.  The crew of the Avenger records the total numb er of 
rounds fired during the life of the gun and will perform certain tasks as the rounds 
accumulate.4  The gun is required to be field stripped, cleaned and lubricated every 1250 
rounds by the Avenger crew.5  There are certain parts (or groups of parts) that are 
replaced as a kit at 2500 and 5000 round intervals by the Avenger repairman.  Additional 
parts are replaced at 10,000 rounds and the gun is nearing depot service at 30,000 
rounds.6  If significant damage occurs, the gun is shipped to Fabrique Nationale 
Manufacturing Incorporated (FNMI) under a depot maintenance contract that has been 
extended several times over the years.  The FNMI depot facility is in Columbia, South 
Carolina, and is a wholly owned subsidiary of FNH.  This contract is for specific , depot-
                                          
2 Interview with Dave Willis, PM SHORAD Logistics Team Lead for Avenger, 16 October 2002.  
3 U.S. Army TM9-1425-433-10, Avenger Operator's Manual. 
4 U.S. Army TM9-1440-433-24-1&2, Avenger Repair Manual. 
5 U.S. Army TM9-1425-433-10, Avenger Operator's Manual. 
6 U.S. Army TM9-1440-433-24-1&2, Avenger Repair Manual and FNH M3P Service Manual.  
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level support of the guns due to extreme wear or accidental damage that is beyond the 
capabilities of the unit -level Avenger repairman.7  
The machine gun is supported by the traditional Army logistic support system as 




















Figure 4.   Current M3P Support Structure.  
 
The unit places a requisition for M3P parts through the local Supply Support 
Activity (SSA), who directs the request to the appropriate command.  Most of the M3P 
consumable parts are stocked by the Def ense Logistics Agency (DLA) and are generally 
turned around in two to three weeks.  Several parts are not stocked and must be ordered 
by the responsible command (AMCOM's Integrated Materials Management Center 
(IMMC) & Acquisition Center).  As DLA stocks ar e depleted, automatic orders are 
generated to replenish the supply.  The original equipment manufacturer (OEM) is the 
only source approved for replacement spares, except for the barrel.  The OEM M3P 
barrel is interchangeable with the M3 barrel, of which the DoD has a large supply.  
Depending on the part, this ordering and delivery activity can take several months.  If 
there has been a part number change, it often involves several letters between the IMMC, 
                                          
7 IMMC Contract Statement of Work, Repair of Avenger and Secondary Items, 24 October 2002. 
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the AMCOM Acquisition Center and the OEM to clarify the nature of the change.  In 
most every case, the change has not affected form, fit, or function, but the changing part 
numbers have caused confusion among the acquisition and logistics support community.  
Figure 5 outlines the complicated mix of organizations that are involved in the support of 




































































Figure 5.   Avenger/M3P Sustainment Organization. 
 
The entire machine gun system contains less than 200 individual parts (see 
Appendix A) that are available from the prime vendor.  Most of the parts are relatively 
small, and are packaged and marked individually.  The consumable parts, like roll pins, 
cotter pins and screws, are packaged in quantities equivalent to the amount found in a 
gun. 
C. CURRENT SUPPORT ISSUES  
The Avenger is the only user of this machine gun in the U.S. DoD.  This presents 
both a problem and an opportunity.  Most of the components of the M3P are unique and 
are not interchangeable with other .50 caliber weapons in the U.S. arsenal.  In order to 
support the Avenger, the Army chose to fully provision the M3P, even though there are 
relatively few in service (less than 1000).  The primary operational issues with the M3P 
9 
are supportability and readiness.  The Avenger’s maintenance concept and location 
within the division does not allow the machine gun to be serviced by qualified armorers 
(small arms repairmen), as with other small arms in DoD.  Instead, the Avenger 
repairman is trained to service the gun while the Avenger crew is trained to  perform 
additional crew-served, maintenance tasks.  The maintenance tasks for the M3P are not 
unreasonable to learn and perform, but an armorer that is trained in small arms, is much 
more specialized and gets to practice his craft daily.  The Avenger 27T repairman is 
primarily an electronics technician and gets limited, hands -on experience with the M3P, 
maybe twice per year.  Additionally, there are very few resident machine gun “experts” at 
Boeing and AMCOM, and no contract currently exists for technical information and 
support through FNH or FNMI.  
The U.S. Army does not own the Technical Data Package (TDP) to the M3P, 
which has been a problem over the years.  Buying the TDP is cost prohibitive and just 
would not make good business sense, considering the small number of these weapons in 
service.8  In trying to maintain the spare parts inventory and keep the supply chain intact, 
AMCOM has had to devote an unusual amount of effort outside the norm. 9  Additionally, 
in dealing with FNH in Belgium, there are language and time variables that can also 
exacerbate the problem.  These problems are not insurmountable, but the resulting delays 
and miscommunications affect the soldier and Marine, who are the ultimate customers.  
More important, the soldier may lose confidence in the weapon as a result of logistics 
delays, which would reflect poorly on the acquisition community.  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The M3P machine gun is similar to other .50 caliber guns in the U.S. Army 
inventory, but is different enough to be in a class by itself.  The gun fires almost three 
times as fast than any other .50 caliber machine gun and must be maintained more 
carefully.  The gun maintenance is performed by the Avenger crew, who are not small -
arms repairmen (armorers).  Prior to fielding, the decision was made to not include an 
armorer in the air defense battalion force structure, so the Avenger crew and repairmen 
must perform all maintenance, except for catastrophic damage or excessive wear.  In this 
                                          
8 Interview with Ms. Kathy Torres, IMMC Lead for Avenger, 15 October 2002.  
9 Interview with Ms. Kathy Torres, IMMC Lead for Avenger, 15 October 2002.  
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case, the gun is shipped to Columbia, S.C., w here contractor depot technicians refurbish 
it.  The M3P is a subsystem to the Avenger weapon system, an NDI acquisition.  The 
U.S. Army does not own the TDP for the gun and does not have configuration control.  
The manufacturer has made many changes over the years, which have caused problems 
when trying to procure spares.  In most every case, the change does not affect form, fit, or 
function, but the changing part numbers have caused confusion among the acquisition 
and logistics support community.  The Army small-arms community at Rock Island 
Arsenal, under the Tank-automotive and Armament Command (TACOM), do not 
recognize the M3P and have absolved themselves of any support requirements.  The M3P 
is the only machine gun supported by AMCOM.  
11 
III. A CASE STUD Y OF PVS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 1994, Secretary of Defense William Perry initiated Acquisition Reform (now 
Acquisition Excellence) policies, causing sweeping changes in many areas of acquisition 
that continue to evolve today.  Reform has brought about changes in program planning, 
specifications, requirements, test and evaluation, systems engineering, and 
documentation.  One area in DoD that has been a challenge for significant change is 
logistics.  It is widely publicized that at least 60 percent of the life-cycle cost of a 
weapons system is in the sustainment phase, after the development and production are 
complete.  With very few new systems in development, we must find ways to improve 
the reliability and lower the support costs of our legacy equipment.  In an  oral statement 
before the House Armed Services Committee (Readiness Subcommittee) on June 27, 
2000, the Honorable Jacques S. Gansler, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), stated, “What we are trying to bring ab out in 
defense logistics has already been demonstrated in the commercial world.”  He continued 
by saying, “In defense logistics, however, such advances are more apt to move at a snail’s 
pace, largely due to institutional resistance, outdated systems and numbing bureaucratic 
delays.”10  Figure 6 depicts the current challenges associated with life-cycle management 
of defense weapon systems, according to Ms. Terry Whalen, Office of the Assistant 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics, Plans and Programs.11 
                                          
10 [http://www.acq.osd.mil/ousda/speech/log_hearing.html], 28 November 2002. 
11 Briefing, Total Life Cycle Systems Management, Ms. Terry Whalen, Office of the Asst. Dep. Under 
Secretary of Defense (Logistics, Plans and Programs), 10 April 2002.  
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• Estimated weapon systems sustainment cost of $62B
– Unable to link cost to performance
• Average Customer Wait Time for most items averages 18 days
– Disconnects across the logistics functions
• Services implementing a variety of performance-based strategies
– We need to accelerate implementation
• PMs responsible for life-cycle management
– Limited sustainment expertise, guidance, funds
– No formal oversight mechanism
• Requirements process that emphasizes weapon system performance
– Limited attention to life-cycle sustainment
 
Figure 6.   DoD Life-Cycle Challenges. 
 
With acquisition reform, many programs are now in place and are slowly starting 
to reap benefits.  Weapon systems managers are responsible for the overall management 
of the system life-cycle that includes timely acquisition that is affordable and meets the 
war fighter's needs, integration of sustainability/maintainability during the acquisition 
process, and weapon systems sustainment cost that will meet or exceed the war fighter's 
performance requirements.12  One program that has received recent attention is Prime 
Vendor Support (PVS).  The remainder of Chapter III will define PVS and examine some 
of the DoD programs that have, or are in the process of, implementing it.   
B. WHAT IS PVS? 
1. PVS and Contractor Logistics Support (CLS)  
PVS could be called an offshoot of the more familiar Contractor Logistics 
Support (CLS).  CLS has been defined as a support concept used to provide all or part of 
the materiel system's logistics support by contract throughout its life-cycle.13  CLS 
includes outsourcing (divesting any organic capability), partnering (sharing between 
                                          
12 Briefing, Total Life Cycle Systems Management, Ms. Terry Whalen, Office of the Asst. Dep. Under 
Secretary of Defense (Logistics, Plans and Programs), 10 April 2002. 
13 CLS Implementation Best Practices Handbook, AMCOM IMMC/PEO Tactical Missiles, April 
2001. 
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public and private sector), augmentation (planned use of public sector in times of war), 
and interim contractor support (planned use of public  sector support while organic 
support is under construction).  In CLS, the contractor provides maintenance, material 
management, and general system support according to a contract vehicle and predicted 
failure factors.  CLS is generally contracted for spec ific support, but can include 
incentives for system performance metrics such as reliability and maintainability. 14  The 
Avenger program used CLS through Boeing for about four years after the initial fielding 
began in 1990.  During that time, the organic support was being structured and parts were 
being provisioned in order to “fill the pipeline.”  Boeing acted as the depot, but also 
supplied parts and services as needed during the organic support build -up.  The CLS 
contract was allowed to expire in 1995, after the Army supply system was adequately 
provisioned.     
PVS is a more recent term, but is comparable to outsourcing under CLS.  The 
primary difference between PVS and CLS outsourcing is that PVS is intended to involve 
only the prime vendor and the associated sub-contractors and vendors.  CLS, on the other 
hand, can include open competition to any vendor that is qualified to perform the service.  
Under a PVS contract, the prime contractor assumes complete support responsibility for 
the system from the very beginning, and the contract is generally for long-term support.  
This includes repair, spare parts, technical support, upgrades, efficiency improvements, 
reliability, maintainability, and overall field performance. 15  The contract is generally 
performance-based and typically includes incentives to drive down support costs and 
improve readiness and reliability by continual upgrades and modernization.  A PVS 
approach provides single point accountability and reduced layers of support 
organizations.  PVS builds  on the best commercial practices that are in place and working 
daily outside of DoD.  
The most publicized example of PVS has been the Army's Apache helicopter 
program.  The Apache program accounts for 22% of the Army's Working Capital Fund 
(AWCF) expenditures, accounting for an estimated $400 million per year.  For Apache, 
the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) would assume nose-to-tail maintenance and 
                                          
14 [http://www.acq-ref.navy.mil/topic.cfm?topic_id=26], 07 January 2002.  
15 [http://www.acq-ref.navy.mil/topic.cfm?topic_id=23], 1 7 January 2002. 
14 
wholesale supply support for the entire weapons system.  Under the proposed agreement, 
the prime vendor (Boeing) would team with the sensor-systems vendor (Lockheed-
Martin) and the engine vendor (General Electric) to form a limited liability company 
called Team Apache Systems (TAS).  TAS would operate under Army oversight and 
management and be responsible for all wholesale support of Apache helicopters all over 
the world.  TAS would eliminate the need for Government personnel and facilities to 
support the Apache.  The new organization would be responsible to acquire, manage, 
store and distribute spare parts and would interface directly with the soldier.  The Army 
intended on taking advantage of commercial practices such as just -in-time-delivery and 
minimum inventories.  TAS would be evaluated on its speed of delivery rather than its 
mass of inventory.16  Addit ionally, TAS guaranteed performance improvements to 
include 25% reduction in spares and repair costs, a 25% reduction in inventory 
investment, a 20% reduction in depot-level returns, unit-level requisition fill rates of 90% 
within five days for routine requests and aircraft-on-the-ground fill rates of 95% within 
24-48 hours both in the United States and overseas.17  The audit firm of Price 
Waterhouse Coopers estimated the program cost to be $4.8B over 20 years.  The 
Government estimate for the same type of work over the same period was $5.5B.  The 
baseline estimate for current operations and support over the same 20 years was $5.9B. 18   
Slightly less publicized than the Apache PVS attempt, Lockheed Martin has total 
PVS responsibility for the Air Force's F-117 Nighthawk aircraft.  The contract was 
designed to eliminate duplication in support infrastructure and move some of the support 
tasks from the Government to private industry.  The cost-plus-incentive contract provides 
for a 50-50 sharing of all cost reductions between the Government and the contractor.  
The objectives of the contracts are to see measured improvements in reliability and 
                                          
16 AR Today, Vol. 4, No. 2, March-April 1999.  
17 Williams, Richard L., Apache PVS: A Case Study of Implementing the PVS Initiative World Wide in 
Support of the AH-64 Apache Helicopter, Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California, September 2000. 
18 [http://www.afji.com/AFJI/Mags/2000/oct/milforce.html], 10 October 2002.  
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system readiness.19  The F-117 support program is one of the more mature programs in 
operation, accounting for $27.8 million in savings and improved aircraft performance.20 
2. Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) 
Another support concept similar to CLS and PVS is Performance-Based Logistics 
(PBL).  PBL is the combined support criteria that the war fighter has specified, possibly 
expressed as Operational Availability.  PBL promotes making logistic capabilities 
integral to the system rather than piecemeal through all of the current logistical elements 
and organizations.  The acquisition program would procure logistic support from a sing le 
vendor (most likely the prime vendor) and obligate the vendor by contract to performance 
metrics such as reliability and availability.21  Boeing was awarded a full development and 
PBL support contract for the Navy's new T -45 jet aircraft trainer and its flight simulator.  
The contract included the delivery of the aircraft and simulators to two sites, then all of 
the follow-on support.  Boeing is required to guarantee the availability of a training 
system (aircraft and simulator) via a performance-based support contract.   
The Air Force has established performance-based agreements with suppliers for 
the F-16 program, shifting total logistics sustainment to contractors for certain avionics.  
PBL programs are structured to measure and evaluate the contractor' s performance by the 
end result, reliability improvements and/or a minimum acceptable availability of the 
system.  PBL provides the contractors with longer-term contracts, allowing them to make 
investments to improve processes, procedures, and spare parts.   The Air Force also 
awarded a contract to Boeing for “flexible support” of the C-17 Globemaster transport 
aircraft.  The contract is not for certain products or services, but instead is focused on the 
capability of the aircraft to be mission-ready.  Since the C-17 is a new aircraft, the Air 
Force and Boeing could start with a “clean sheet” for a support approach without the 
headaches of dealing with current programs, inventories, and personnel.  Boeing is 
currently in a second, three-year PBL contract for CLS/PVS of the C-17.22   
 
                                          
19 Reduction of Total Ownership Costs (R-TOC), PM Magazine, January-February 2002. 
20 [http://www.govexec.com/features/0900/0900s3s1.htm], 30 July 2002.  
21 [http://www.acq-ref.navy.mil/topic.cfm?topic_id=30], 07 January 2002.  
22 [http://www.avaitionnow.com/content/publication/om/200106/om71.htm], 30 August 2002.  
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3. Fleet Management and Reliability -Centered Maintenance (RCM)  
Fleet Management is a concept that provides support for a family of vehicles 
(tanks, trucks, helicopters, etc) by a competitive contract to the best-qualified contractor.  
Like CLS, this may or may not include the prime vendor for the particular vehicle. 23  
Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) is the concept of developing a maintenance 
scheme based on the reliability of the various components of the system.  Implementin g a 
preventative maintenance program using RCM can greatly reduce the cost of ownership 
by focused attention on the reliability-drivers of the system.  Modernization-through-
spares is an element of RCM where systems are upgraded by technology insertion 
through the major components and Line Replaceable Units (LRUs).  Using RCM and 
fleet management, the Army's Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT) is 
inserting new technologies to improve performance and reduce the O&S cost by 
replacement of high failure-rate items across the fleet.  The Navy's Multi-Mission 
Helicopter (H-60 series) program will reduce the logistics requirements by consolidating 
the various makes/models of the H-60 aircraft, then employing RCM concepts to increase 
reliability, reduce costs and improve aircraft availability. 
4. Virtual Prime Vendor (VPV) and Direct Vendor Delivery (DVD)  
The older C-5 Galaxy transport aircraft is supported by a contract through the 
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) as a partner in its Virtual Prime Vendor (VPV) and 
Direct Vendor Delivery (DVD) initiatives.  The VPV contract gives responsibility for 
supply support of a weapon system to a single contractor.  DVD allows shipping of 
spares directly from the vendor to the maintenance facility, without passing thro ugh a 
central warehouse.  For the C-5, Lockheed Martin Aircraft & Logistics Center (LMALC), 
is responsible for managing all of the consumable parts and payment is based on cost and 
performance.  LMALC is responsible for over a thousand suppliers as well as  its own, 
internal production.  LMALC and its host of direct vendors are required to deliver parts 
within eight days, anywhere in the world.  The focus of the contractor is to also reduce 
the number of resources needed to manage the program by employing be tter forecasting 
techniques.  LMALC is using Government data to populate its internal forecasting 
system, but with time, they will develop their own data, expecting a 20% improvement 
                                          
23 [http://www.almc.army.mil/ALOG/issues/JanFeb99/MS383.htm], 02 April 2002.  
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over the DLA system.  According to LMALC, the Government data is often in complete 
and not up-to-date.  LMALC's data system will be near real-time and more reliable.  If 
successful, the C-5 program could be a model for other older aircraft support programs, 
such as the C-130 and P-3.24 
5. Partnering and Teaming 
Partnering with industry is another variation of PVS.  Government and industry 
have always had an obvious supplier -customer relationship.  However, the partnering 
organizations have had separate management structures, information systems, and data, 
except where bound by a contract.  The Navy's F/A-18E/F Integrated Readiness Support 
Teaming (FIRST) program retains core functions for the Navy, but expands the role of 
industry.  The expansion is not just more contracts, but more sharing of information and 
integrated support roles.  The contractor's role in engineering services is focused on 
reliability and maintainability improvements, rather than the normal role of 
development.25  Partnering promotes the integration of Government/industry databases 
and information systems.  The sharing of data and the integration of management controls 
by both organizations puts the emphasis on the quality of a product or service, and not in 
the interpretation of a contract.  The primary driver of the FIRST program is readiness.  
The system is designed to improve the fleet material availability, improve reliability of 
the aircraft and its subsystems, and maintain a consistent pace of equipment 
modernization by incremental upgrades.   
The Navy's FIRST program also includes a teaming arrangement between 
industry and the traditional Government supply -support organizations.  Laws that place 
limits on the workload split between Government and industry govern all of the U.S. 
DoD depots.  Congress has declared that it is essential to national security tha t DoD 
retains an organic, depot-level maintenance and repair capability in the U.S.  Title 10 of 
the United States Code requires that Government employees must perform a minimum 
percentage work-share at the nation's depots.  U.S. depots have been working under a 
Government-industry split for years, but the workload split has been creeping toward 
                                          
24 [http://www.avaitionnow.com/content/publication/om/200106/om71.htm ], 30 August 2002. 
25 Briefing, F/A 18E/F Integrated Readiness Support Teaming (FIRST), A U.S. Navy/Boeing 
Partnership to Improve Fleet Support and Lower Support Costs, Navy/Boeing, 02 November 2002.  
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more contracted-out services, within the interpretation of the law.26  The FIRST program 
makes use of current aircraft depots and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA),  but also 
interjects Boeing within the scope.  The Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), the 
Naval Inventory Control Point (NAVICP), DLA, and Boeing will share the work, with 
NAVICP providing program oversight.  Boeing will become the Inventory Control Point  
(ICP) for certain components, support equipment and consumables.  DLA will be the ICP 
for F/A-18A-F common parts and multi-platform consumables.  The Navy Depots 
(NADEPs) will continue to maintain organic repair capabilities for all platform 
variations, even receiving work from Boeing.27  Boeing and the NADEPs (North Island, 
Cherry Point, and Jacksonville) have agreed to a Commercial Services Agreement (CSA) 
that defines the business relationship and both team members have agreed to a Task 
Description Document (TDD) that further defines the scope of work.  
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has recognized the value of partnering with 
industry and other Government organizations by building long-term relationships based 
on performance and quality.  The DLA has aggressively pursued partnering arrangements 
to help reduce cost and turnaround time for its logistic core services, in both peacetime 
and war.  DLA has expanded existing relationships and formed new ones, as their 
experience grows and they learn what is successful.  Partnering with industry is an 
integral part of DLA's drive to improve.  Such partnerships also includes elements of 
PVS, Vendor Managed Inventory, PBL, VPV, DVD and other demonstration projects.  
DLA's Defense Supply Center Columbus (DSCC) and its partner Deutsch Manufacturing 
found an innovative way to reduce backorders by a production line balancing technique.  
The effort reduced 900 backorders to 222 and prevented several potential backorders 
from happening.  High priority backorders decreas ed by 20% and overall, backorders 
dropped by 75%.  The DSCC has now expanded the effort to include nine other 
suppliers.28 
 
                                          
26 USC, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part IV, Chapter 146, Section 2466.  
27 Briefing, F/A 18E/F Integrated Readiness Support Teaming (FIRST), A U.S. Navy/Boeing 
Partnership to Improve Fleet Support  and Lower Support Costs, Navy/Boeing, 02 November 2002.  
28 [http://www.dla.mil/Dimensions/Almanac/Part.htm], 28 November 2001.  
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6. Supply Chain Management (SCM)  
Supply Chain Management (SCM) is a commercial term and process that is being 
adapted more and more in the defense industry.  The key ingredient in Supply Chain 
Management is communication.  The information flow of orders, inventory, 
transportation, and billing for thousands of suppliers to several, worldwide locations is 
where the DoD is expecting to reap benefits.  SCM includes the advantages of a just-in-
time delivery system, but with greater visibility during the process.  SCM is becoming an 
industry within industry, as independent companies are formed to provide this service to 
other companies.  Although many companies adopt SCM internally, many are opting to 
contract out this supply support service.29  The Navy's FIRST program is centered on the 
process of SCM and the associated integrated information systems.  Figure 7 depicts the 
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Figure 7.   F/A-18E/F F.I.R.S.T.: How It Works. 
                                          
29 Briefing, F/A 18E/F Integrated Readiness Support Teaming (FIRST), A U.S. Navy/Boeing 
Partnership to Improve Fleet Support and Lower Support Costs, Navy/Boeing, 02 November 2002.  
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SCM supports the partnership between Government and industry by the sharing 
of data and resources, rather than duplication.  SCM supports the reduction in total 
ownership costs by providing accurate and timely data to the decision -makers, suppliers 
and customers.  
7. Contractor Delivery System (CDS) 
The Army's Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD) Project Office recently 
awarded (October 2002) a contract to Raytheon for a PVS -like program called the 
Sentinel Contractor Delivery System (CDS).  The Sentinel is the Army's ground-based, 
mobile air defense radar that provides a local air picture and target cueing to the 
SHORAD air defense commander and the associated fire units (Avenger, Linebacker, & 
the Man Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS).  The Sentinel CDS is the result of a 
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Figure 8.   Sentinel CDS Development History. 
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The Sentinel CDS program is the result of an Integrated Product Team Process 
that evaluated five alternatives before selecting the CDS and Government Depot Partner 
concept.  Figure 9 depicts the elements of the CDS program. 
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Figure 9.   Sentinel CDS Elements.  
 
The Sentinel CDS is designed to provide the Army a minimum readiness rate of 
90% for both the fleet average and the unit -level readiness rate.  The program will not 
have any Authorized Stockage List (ASL) spares and only 32 Prescribed Load List (PLL) 
spares to start.  The contractor will be free to adjust PLL spares in order to optimize the 
readiness rate to meet or exceed the contracted readiness requirement.  Under the 
contract, the user will receive repair parts for free, but documentation will still pass 
through the SSA.  The contractor will provide a 24/7 Help Line and a Contact Team on 
request.  The contractor is incentivized to improve readiness through redesign of high 
failure rate items (RCM), improved processes (PBL), and reduced administration burdens 
(PBL & SCM). 
The Sentinel CDS IPPT did not want to impose this program without future 
assessments and possible reevaluation.  The program is designed to first complete a 
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ninety-day Limited User Implementation (LUI) using CDS to support one Army 
Division.  This will verify the validity of materiel issue without inclusion of a Defense 
Finance and Accounting System (DFAS) transaction, verify the unique parts catalog, 
verify the 24/7 Help Line and responsiveness, and verify the process for the Contact 
Teams, if needed.  After implementation, there will be a follow -on assessment after two 
years, then additional assessments as required.30  The contract for this service is with the 
PM rather than through the IMMC.  The PM is now directly responsible for life-cycle 
support of the Sentinel radar and will control the contract and the funding.  The Sentinel 
CDS program is one initiative that currently has the greatest control of life cycle funding 
by a PM to a single contractor.31  The initial contract award was in October 2002, so this 
will be a program to watch.    
8. Reduction of Total Ownership Costs (R -TOC) 
In 1999, Dr. Gansler established a process called the Reduction in Total 
Ownership Cost (R-TOC).  This effort was started due to the concern for the rising cost 
of logistics and the simultaneous depletion of funds for modernization.  Although R-TOC 
attacks the ownership cost issue from many fronts, a core element is PVS.  R-TOC has 
remained intact through the most recent administration change and includes many 
projects from the three major services.  In order to be considered an R-TOC pilot activity, 
the programs were required to focus on three areas for potential savings: 
· Reliability and maintainability improvements (RM)  
· Reduced supply chain delivery times (SC)  
· Competitive sourcing of product support (PS)  
All of these areas have benefits associated with PVS.  For R-TOC, each service 
has ten weapon system projects listed as pilot progr ams (Figure 10).  Per instruction from 
the USD(AT&L), each of the programs must focus their efforts on one, two, or all three 
of the above listed areas.  Sixteen out of the thirty programs include all three areas in 
their savings approach (four for the Army, five for the Navy/Marine Corps, and seven for 
the Air Force).  All of the sixteen include activities such as PVS, PBL, reliability -
centered maintenance, performance-based support contracts, partnering with industry, 
                                          
30 Sentinel CDS Site Activation Briefing, LTC David Cook, Sentinel Product Manager, May 2002.  
31 Briefing, Total Life Cycle Systems Management, Ms. Terry Whalen, 10 April 2002.  
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and CLS.32  The R-TOC programs are required to participate in Pilot Program Forums, 
which allow a free exchange of ideas across the various programs so that all may benefit 
from the experience of the other programs.  The R-TOC forum consolidates the progress 
and performance of many initiatives  across the DoD and will be a valuable source of 
lessons -learned, contracting incentives, measurement tools, legislative/regulatory 
barriers, and cost savings estimates.   
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Figure 10.   R-TOC Pilot Programs.  
 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
PVS is a term that has become synonymous with contracting out to prime 
vendors, lock, stock, and barrel.  This chapter has shown that PVS is more than a single -
faceted approach and that there are several features of PVS that are present in other 
logistics cost-saving programs.  CLS, PBL, CDS, DVD, VPV, Partnering, RCM, SCM, 
and others have collectively encouraged integrated systems and communication, faster 
turnaround times for orders, reduced inventories, just-in-time deliveries, single point of 
contact, lower overhead costs, long-term contracts, work-sharing, performance-based 
                                          
32 Reduction of Total Ownership Costs (R-TOC), PM Magazine, January-February 2002. 
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contracts and programs, reliability improvements, and modernization through spares.  
There is no “one size fits all” approach to improving DoD logistics.  There are certain 
core tasks that cannot be contracted out due to current laws and/or unique expertise.  The 
Army, Navy, Marine Corp, and Air Force are all participating in PVS -like programs.  
Acquisition reform has allowed PMs to explore alternative ways of doing business and 
many have been successful.  The DoD has initiated the R-TOC pilot programs as a way 
to give visibility to many of these logistics improvement programs, but also to 
consolidate initiatives to gain lessons-learned.  Newer programs such as the C-17, F/A-
18E/F, and Sentinel may have the latitude to start with a clean slate for their logistic 
programs and experiment with alternate support concepts.  Established programs like the 
C-5 and the Avenger have to look for ways to adapt these cost -savings programs within 
the existing, legacy support structure.  The following chapter will outline the advantages 
and disadvantages of the various programs studied in this chapter, and recommend a PVS 
approach that may benefit the M3P machine gun system.  
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IV. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF PVS FOR THE 
M3P 
A. INTRODUCTION 
By implementing PVS concepts, the DoD has the potential to reduce the cost of 
ownership (personnel, facilities, and inventory) and, at the same time, build an effective 
support network within the Defense Industrial Base.  With PVS, the prime contractor 
provides much of the hardware and manpower, but also executes the appropriate 
contracts with subcontractors, Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), system 
integrators and other specialty vendors.33  PVS has the potential to provide a simplified 
management structure, a single point of accountability, reduced spares acquisition time 
and reduced inventory levels.34  Using performance and incentive-based contracting, 
PVS promises to also improve the reliability of weapon systems by  effective spares 
management and continuous upgrades to stay ahead of obsolescence issues.  
Additionally, the M3P is currently supported by two levels of maintenance, which means 
that PVS could be applied at the depot level without negative impact at the unit level.  In 
total, PVS could result in a significant reduction in Operation and Support (O&S) costs, 
an increase in readiness, and systems that are more modern and capable. 35  This chapter 
will examine the PVS concepts from the previous chapter and analy ze their advantages 
and disadvantages, as they apply to the M3P.  
B. ANALYSIS OF PVS CONCEPTS 
1. PVS and Contractor Logistics Support (CLS)  
a. Advantages 
An important advantage of PVS for the M3P is a single point of contact 
for any issues with support of t he machine gun system.  The unit can currently contact the 
depot (LEAD), Boeing, the IMMC, and the PM, but none can guarantee complete 
expertise on the system.  The unit may try to contact small -arms repairmen within the 
division, but the M3P is unique and its support structure is not the same service as that of 
                                          
33 [http://www.acq-ref.navy.mil/topic.cfm?topic_id=23], 17 January 2002. 
34 Article:  Prime Vendor Support - The Wave of the Future.  
[http://www.almc.mil/ALOG/issues/JanFeb99/MS383.htm], 02 April 2002.  
35 Article:  AR Today, Volume 4, No. 2, March/April 1999, “Apache Prime Vendor Support”.  
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other .50 caliber weapons.  Under PVS, FNH/FNMI would be the “go to” contact for 
technical, operational, and logistics information.  When an M3P machine gun system 
issue occurs in the field, there would be one place to call for support.  The PVS/CLS 
contract could be structured to allow a contact team (if needed) to visit the location and 
provide emergency service support anywhere in the world.  PVS could allow the unit to 
interface directly with the prime vendor when ordering spare parts for the gun system, 
reducing the chance of ordering the wrong parts.  Additionally, direct interface would 
allow the unit to choose the method of shipment, depending on the circumstances and 
urgency of the order.  Average wait time for parts could be 2-3 days rather than the 
current estimate of 18 days.  PVS could also allow for technology insertions as a part of 
supply support, helping to keep the system current and improving reliability by 
employing RCM techniques.  Lastly, ordering spare parts direct from the vendor would 
reduce the cost of the parts by eliminating AWCF overhead charges, which could be as 
much as 40%.  
The primary argument for PVS centers on increased efficiency and some 
level of anticipated savings .  For Apache, the Army had negotiated a 17 percent reduction 
in cost per flying hour through the period of performance of the firm fixed -price contract.  
This also included over $325 million in modernization through spares, which was 
expected to contribute to the 17 percent reduction.36  The Price Waterhouse Coopers 
estimate of savings for Apache PVS was $1B over 20 years.  The Government's estimate 
of PVS-like changes to Apache operations and support was about $.7B over the same 20 -
year period.  For the M3P, a baseline cost of doing business the current way would have 
to be established and used for comparison with a PVS/CLS program.     
b. Disadvantages 
An important concern of PVS/CLS is the obligation of contractors on the 
battlefield in times of war.  Corporations have generally continued to service contracts in 
times of war, but will they be able to keep quality, knowledgeable people in the forward 
area, to include support from their subcontractors?  As more contractors are added to 
logistics support, there will be a need to provide for their protection on the battlefield.  
Uniformed logistics specialists are also trained as soldiers and can supplement the 
                                          
36 AR Today, Vol. 4, No. 2, March-April 1999.  
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fighting force as required.  Contract personnel are non-combatants and must be assured 
some level of protection by the military.  This could lead to personnel increases in the 
battle area, negating some of the benefit of PVS.  Today’s threat of asymmetrical warfare 
only complicates the issue when it comes to protecting non -combatants.  In the past, rear 
areas were thought to be relatively safe, but with chemical, biological, and nuclear 
threats, the boundaries of the battle area become blurred.37  
A primary reason for the failure of the Apache PVS was its effect on the 
Army Working Capital Fund (AWCF).  The loss of the Apache spares revenue within the 
fund would virtually “bankrupt” the system unless the PVS contractor bought them from 
the Army at the “retail” price.  The Apache parts represent an inventory valued between 
$200 and $500 million and the annual expenditure has been about $400M,  which affects 
the AWCF surcharge.  Additionally, other Army officials, who were opposed to the PVS 
concept, contested the cost savings estimates, stating that estimates for emergencies and 
other “over and above” costs wer e not considered38.  Although the M3P spares at DLA 
aren't anywhere near this amount (estimated to be worth about $2M39), there would be an 
associated cost to extract those spares from the AWCF and hand them to a PVS 
contractor. 
The implementation of PVS in general would displace Government 
workers to some degree.  Much of the work being done at DLA, the depots and other 
support organizations would transfer to a PVS contract, depending on the contract scope.  
For the M3P, there are very few (if any) Government employees that are tied directly to 
the M3P, and only the M3P.  For other programs, this might not be the case.  Although it 
is a concern, it is not a major disadvantage for a PVS concept for the M3P.  
2. Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) 
a. Advantages 
Each Avenger comes with a single M3P machine gun system.  There are 
no spare guns (floats), so each gun contributes directly to the readiness of the Avenger.  
                                          
37 Article:  Contractors on the Battlefield: Risks on the Road Ahead?, 
[http://www.almc.mil/ALOG/issues/JanFeb99/MS376.htm ], 03 June 2002. 
38 http://www.afji.com/AFJI/Mags/2000/oct/milforce.html; 10 October 2002.  
39 Interview via Email with Ms. Kathy Torres (IMMC-Maintenance) and Mr. Leon Stanley (IMMC-
Item Manager), 05 November 2002.  
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Although the M3P does not have a direct reliability requirement, tests by the PM 
measured the Mean-Rounds -Between-Stoppage of the M3P to be in excess of 4000 
rounds.  This, of course, was with proper maintenance and the appropriate replacement 
parts.  By implementing PBL, the contractor's support performance could be measured by 
the readiness of the Avenger, with particular regard to the M3P machine gun system.  
Although the exact performance metrics are not known at this time, the standard for the 
entire weapon system could be allocated to each of the primary components, including 
the M3P.  Once the baseline is determined for the M3P, the PVS contractor could be 
incentivized to improve the reliability by material changes, additional training, or some 
other method.  Increasing the reliability if the M3P would improve the readiness of the 
Avenger and instill confidence in the Avenger crew.  
b. Disadvantages 
PBL would be very difficult to implement for the M3P because it would 
be difficult to obtain realistic performance data on the guns.  Although the M3P was 
tested and evaluated for reliability, there is not an established reliability standard or 
requirement.  Availability of the machine gun is not a requirement associated with small 
arms.  A gun is either available or it's not.  Currently, Operational Availability of the 
Avenger is reported at the system level, but it is calculated based on the missile system 
and fire control components and does not include the M3P.   
3. Fleet Management and Reliability -Centered Maintenance (RCM)  
a. Advantages 
Fleet Management is not directly applicable to the M3P.  However , many 
of the PVS contracts examined contain RCM or incentives for modernization -through-
spares.  The contractor could be incentivized to insert system upgrades to keep the system 
up-to-date and to preclude obsolescence issues as the weapon system matures.   RCM 
would track the reliability drivers of the system and implement material improvements 
that could improve the system reliability/maintainability and increase the service life.  
The M3P is based on a design from the 1920's, but is able to perform relia bly at the 
elevated rate-of-fire because of the updated design and the advances in metallurgy.  The 
M3P would continue to be an inexpensive, increasingly effective weapon as materials 
and manufacturing techniques improve and with future advances in ammunit ion, such as 
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the Sabot Light Armor Penetrator (SLAP) .50 caliber (12.7 mm) round, which could add 
range and penetration power to the M3P.  
b. Disadvantages 
RCM for the M3P will add cost by the Government to review each change 
proposal and modernization of components will involve some level of testing to confirm 
reliability and safety prior to fielding a change.   
4. Virtual Prime Vendor (VPV) and Direct Vendor Delivery (DVD)  
a. Advantages 
VPV and DVD could allow the unit to interface directly with the prime 
vendor when ordering spare parts for the M3P gun system.  Currently, ordering through 
the supply system does not require a working knowledge of the M3P by the supply clerks 
or item managers.  Their expertise is in the part number, National Stock Number (NS N), 
nomenclature, and the “system” in which this information resides.  Using VPV, an 
Avenger repairman would call the prime vendor and would connect to a knowledgeable 
technician manning a help desk, who possibly would be able to resolve the issue over the 
phone.  If a part should need to be ordered, the repairman would more likely get the right 
part shipped at the right time, reducing the chance for the need to reorder.  Like the 
commercial world, the unit could choose to have the parts shipped via normal common 
carriers (U.S. Postal Service, UPS, DHL, etc.), or overnight in an emergency.  In a war 
environment, the unit would deploy with a pre-determined supply of spares for each gun 
in the battalion and replenishment spares would be shipped into the theate r as needed by 
military transport. 
The current inventory levels for the M3P at DLA are for “just-in-case” (an 
estimated 10,000 parts40) rather than optimized for the demand (an estimated 500 
requisitions per month41).  PVS contracts are generally incentivized for the contractor to 
reduce cost and overhead and still meet or exceed the minimum readiness.  PVS could 
allow the contractor to maintain the absolute minimum inventory levels and build his 
own database for determining what the level should be.   
                                          
40 Interview via Email with Ms. Kathy Torres (IMMC-Maintenance) and Mr. Leon Stanley (IMMC-
Item Manager), 05 November 2002.  
41 Interview via Email with Ms. Kathy Torres (IMMC-Maintenance) and Mr. Leon Stanley (IMMC-
Item Manager), 05 November 2002.  
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b. Disadvantages 
VPV does not apply to the M3P because very little service is performed at 
a central location, such as the depot.  There are no disadvantages to DVD for the M3P, 
except for the possibility of displaced Government workers, which has been previously 
addressed in this chapter.  
5. Partnering and Teaming 
a. Advantages 
Partnering or Teaming with industry for PVS (or some variant of PVS) 
would allow the defense industry to stay in the business.  The U.S. defense budget has 
been in a net decline for over  a decade and many defense-related companies have sold 
out to larger concerns, divested themselves of the defense business, or closed their doors 
altogether.  The life-cycle support of current and future weapon systems could be enough 
to help keep small and medium-sized companies in business.  FNH (through FNMI) is 
one of the largest suppliers of small arms to the U.S. DoD, but is small compared to many 
defense conglomerates.  As defense budgets ebb and flow and new orders prove 
unreliable, the company could change the focus of its business from production to life-
cycle support, allowing it to stay in the Defense Industrial Base.  In the future, if there 
should be need for a small to medium arms production capability, FNMI would be in 
position to ramp up for production again very quickly.         
b. Disadvantages 
There are no disadvantages to Partnering/Teaming for the M3P as long as 
the relationship is clearly outlined and established to promote communication and 
information sharing.  In support of other sys tems, discussions could well become mired 
in the pros and cons of Government support versus contractor support.  In the case of the 
M3P, the arguments are framed in contractor support versus no support at all.  
6. Supply Chain Management (SCM)  
a. Advantages 
Supply Chain Management could improve the communication between the 
operating units and the source for M3P parts and expertise.  An SCM system could 
provide an information source for orders, inventory, transportation status, and billing for 
the M3P customers and would be relatively easy to implement because of the small 
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number of parts in inventory.  An SCM system would allow Government organizations, 
the vendor, and the customer to access the same database of information regarding the 
M3P.  SCM could include a just-in-time delivery system that could minimize the in -
process inventory at FNH/FNMI, reducing overhead costs and improving material flow in 
their production process.  A website for technical briefs, lessons -learned, “how to” 
information, recent part changes, system alerts, and a catalog ordering system could 
benefit the user and provide a common access point for all.  
b. Disadvantages 
Implementing an SCM system could possibly require a change in the 
normal operating procedures at the unit level, or at least changes to legacy software.  
Different forms, computer programs, and procedures may be perceived as a nuisance in 
the day-to-day operations of the Avenger repairman.  Additionally, there is an up-front 
cost associated with implementing a SCM system and some level of yearly sustainment. 
7. Contractor Delivery System (CDS) 
a. Advantages 
CDS could provide the same benefits discussed earlier in this chapter for 
CLS/PVS.  CDS is a successful model for planning a PVS -like concept.  The PM, the 
contractor and the user participated in an IPT process to design a system that could be 
mutually beneficial, efficient, and affordable.  The implementation of CDS for Sentinel 
includes a trial period and a reassessment before full implementation.  Another 
assessment is planned after two years to see if the program is working as planned or may 
need some adjustment.  The Sentinel CDS system has recently been implemented 
(October 2002) and should be watched as model for other programs, to include the M3P.  
The M3P is managed out of the same PM office as Sentinel, so there should be real-time 
lessons -learned and experience available to the M3P program.  
b. Disadvantages 
The disadvantages of CDS for the M3P are the same as those discussed for 





8. Reduction of Total Ownership Costs (R -TOC) 
a. Advantages 
The implementation of PVS for the M3P can benefit from the R-TOC pilot 
programs that are either in place or soon to be implemented.  The R-TOC programs have 
projected a combined estimated fiscal savings in 2005 for the Army (12%), the Navy 
(18%) and the Air Force (10%)42.  These projected savings are averages and should not 
be used to project the “goodness” of each service program.  The goal of the R-TOC 
program is to achieve a 20% savings in life-cycle support costs.  If the services are able to 
come close to these savings, other programs will more likely follow.  The R-TOC 
programs could be a valuable source for lessons-learned and best practices that may 
apply to the M3P.     
b. Disadvantages 
The R-TOC Pilot Programs have already recognized that O&S funding 
restrictions are a distinct disadvantage.  O&S support funding is one-year money, 
meaning it must be obligated yearly and there is no guarantee that the same level of 
funding will be available in subsequent years.  PVS/CLS initiatives rely on long-term 
contracts and partnerships that guarantee a level of work the contractor can rely on.  
Annual budget issues such as limits on appropriations categories, reprogramming 
restrictions, and Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) make PVS contracting an 
incomplete solution if funded by O&S alone.   
R-TOC programs have also determined that tools and processes are 
inadequate to measure PVS savings and perform the trade-off analyses needed to make 
the strategic decisions.  This only complicates the estimating and projections needed to 
implement and maintain a PVS-like contract on a yearly basis.   
R-TOC programs have also discovered that if true savings are realized, 
there are no guarantees that the program can apply those savings to another area of their 
program.  R-TOC savings are likely to cause a reduction in O&S funding across the 
services in the future, rather than be available for the program that earned it.  Unless the 
anticipated savings of an M3P PVS contract can be applied to another area of Avenger 
(such as the modernization of another component), the PM has no incentive to put forth 
                                          
42 Reduction of Total Ownership Costs (R-TOC), PM Magazine, January-February 2002. 
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the effort and change the process.  The last major disadvantage is the PM's lack of control 
of the program's life-cycle support funding.43  With no significant source of seed money 
for a new -start PVS program and limited control of long-term sustainment funds, there is 
little incentive for PMs to “rock the boat” and attempt to change the course.   
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The M3P is a relatively obscure component on an established weapons platform 
that could be used to implement an alternative program, experiment with the process, 
measure the performance and either proclaim victory or quietly go back to the old way of 
doing business.  Small size is a distinct advantage for change, rather than attacking a 
huge program like the Apache, with all of the established logistics stakeholders.   
The virtues of PVS have yet to be proven over a period of time (including 
peacetime and wartime) and contractors have not had to deal with such a large area of 
logistics responsibility in the past.  The DoD and defense contractors have always been 
notorious for over -estimating the savings projections and/or under-estimating the cost of 
other programs.  How can we expect estimates for PVS concepts to be any different?  
Some projected the Apache PVS 20-year savings to be substantial while others argued 
that the estimates were “critically flawed” and “not defensible.”  The Apache PVS 
program cost was difficult to estimate because it was so huge, complex, and 
controversial.  
There are many advantages and disadvantages to PVS concepts in general, but the 
application of PVS must be tailored for the specific needs of the program.  The research 
for this thesis shows there are many variations of PVS, and each has associated 
advantages and disadvantages, depending on the application.  The idea of contractor 
support and contracting out are not new, but partnering with industry and sharing 
information between the public and private sector are new to the DoD.  For the M3P, 
there is currently no working relationship (engineering services) with the prime vendor 
(FNH/FNMI).  The advantages listed above would be welcomed by the end -user of the 
system, and that is where the effect should be measured.  The Avenger crew -member 
would simply see more timely parts availability and more accurate information when 
needed.  The cost-savings to the Army and improved readiness are the by-products from 
                                          
43 Reduction of Total Ownership Costs (R-TOC), PM Magazine, January-February 2002. 
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satisfying the support needs of the end-user (customer), but are difficult to accurately 
predict and effectively measure.   
There are many disadvantages to PVS as a general strategy, but most (as with the 
advantages) are dependent on the application.  For the M3P, contractors would not be 
needed on the battlefield to support the M3P.  PVS for the M3P would be well suited as a 
preventative maintenance measure, which is where most of the effort is, except for rare 
occasions when Avengers might be deployed in a battle area for a long period.  In this 
case, PVS could be applied to the rear areas, perhaps as the Avengers are off-loaded in 
theater, or as they return from the battle area for other service needs.  As with any O&S 
support, PVS would be subject to the funding restrictions of O&S funding, impacting the 
contract support during normal budget fluctuations and funding trade -offs between other 
higher-priority programs. 
The next chapter will draw conclusions and make recommendations about PVS 
for the M3P, and suggest topics for furth er study of this subject.      
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V. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS, CONCLUSIONS, 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Question 
· How might a PVS program be implemented for the U.S. Army’s Avenger 
M3P machine gun system? 
A PVS program could be implemented for the M3P by a partnership with 
FNH/FNMI, using the IPT process to outline and structure a mutually beneficial 
arrangement, prior to entering into any contract negotiations.  After the scope is defined, 
cost estimates could be made for a PVS program and funding could be identified.  A 
PVS/CLS concept would work best for the M3P, since the prime vendor is the only 
source of support for the M3P.  Using lessons -learned and best practices from the R-TOC 
programs and Sentinel CDS, an M3P P VS concept would have a starting advantage over 
support programs tried elsewhere.  
2. Subsidiary Questions 
· What is the purpose of the Avenger weapon system and the M3P machine 
gun subsystem? 
The U.S. Army’s Avenger air defense system is designed to counter  aerial threats 
such as attack helicopters, cruise missiles, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and low -
level fixed-wing aircraft.  The firing turret incorporates eight STINGER missiles (in two 
launch pods) with a .50 caliber machine gun (M3P) for close-in aircraft and ground attack 
protection.    
· What are the attributes of the M3P, where is it fielded, and what is the 
logistic support strategy? 
The M3P .50 caliber machine gun system is a high rate-of-fire, single barrel, 
recoil-operated, electrically fired machine gun based on the AN-M3 class of Browning-
designed guns.  The Avenger is fielded at fourteen CONUS locations, Hawaii, Germany, 
and Korea (see Figure 2).  Two levels of maintenance, organizational and depot, currently 
support the M3P.  Most of the maintenance tasks are accomplished at the organizational 
level by the Avenger crewman (MOS 14S) and the Avenger repairman (MOS 27T).  
Spare parts are requisitioned through the Army Supply Support Activity (SSA) and 
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warehoused at DLA.  LEAD provides depot support for the Avenger, but ships the M3P 
to FNMI for depot service.  
· What is prime vendor support (PVS) and what are some examples of PVS 
in operation? 
PVS is a concept where the prime contractor of a weapon system assumes 
complete support responsibility for the system from the very beginning, and the contract 
is generally for long-term support.  This includes repair, spare parts, technical support, 
upgrades, efficiency improvements, reliability, maintainability, and overall field 
performance.  Examples of PVS in operation can be found within the R-TOC Pilot 
Programs sponsored by the DoD and discussed in Chapters III and IV of this thesis.  
· What are the advantages and disadvantages of supporting the M3P through 
PVS? 
This thesis has shown that PVS could be an advantage for the M3P by increasing 
readiness and improving the performance of the machine gun system, and potentially 
reducing the life-cycle support cost.  The Avenger's M3P machine gun is an ideal 
candidate for a PVS-like program because it is a clearly separate component on the 
Avenger and different from any other .50 caliber machine gun system in the U.S. DoD.  
The M3P is also clearly differentiated within the current logistic system and can be 
isolated for study.  The primary disadvantages to PVS are the issue of contractors on the 
battlefield, the effect of PVS on the Working Capital Fund (WCF) and the displacement 
of Government employees.      
· What conclusions and recommendations might be drawn from this case 
study, regarding application of PVS to weapons subsystems used by the 
Army or other services? 
This thesis has shown that PVS could increase readiness and improve the 
performance of the M3P, and potentially reduce the life-cycle support cost.  PVS must 
only be applied where it makes sense to do so, and after careful consideration of the 
requirements for peacetime and deployment for war.  PVS contractors should be 
established DoD suppliers and have adequate quality systems, storage and warehousing 
for parts, and the core personnel (managerial, adminis trative, and technical) to administer 
a PVS support contract.  PVS for large, established programs like the Apache proved to 
be “too much, too soon.”  For the legacy systems, smaller programs or possibly 
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subsystems to larger programs could be considered as  candidates for a PVS-like support 
concept.  The recommendations listed in this thesis could apply to any program 
considering a PVS support concept.  
B. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has shown that PVS could increase readiness and improve the 
performance of the M3P.  Although there is limited data, PVS concepts have also 
contributed to life-cycle cost savings (the F-117 program claims $27.8M in savings and 
the Army, Navy, and Air Force R-TOC programs are forecasting 12%, 18%, and 10% 
reductions, respectively, starting in 2005).  PVS must only be applied where it makes 
sense to do so, and after careful consideration of the requirements for peacetime and 
deployment for war.  PVS contractors are generally established DoD suppliers and have 
adequate quality systems, storage and warehousing for parts, and the core personnel 
(managerial, administrative, and technical) to administer a PVS support contract.  If the 
contractor is serious about customer satisfaction and wants to get into the life-cycle 
support business, then a PVS contract for the M3P will be more likely to be successful.  
The following conclusions have been reached by this thesis research: 
1. Conclusion One  
The Avenger's M3P machine gun is an good candidate for a PVS -like program 
because it is a clearly separate component on the Avenger, and different from any other 
.50 caliber machine gun system in the U.S. DoD.  The M3P is also clearly differentiated 
within the current logistic system and can be isolated for study.  The M3P machine gun 
system is currently almost entirely supported at the organizational level and will not 
likely be negatively affected by a PVS implementation.  On the contrary, support at the 
retail level could be enhanced by a PVS help desk arrangement.  Depot maintenance 
(where the bulk PVS would be applied) is for only the most extreme damage or extended 
wear from the cumulative effects of firing.  M3P guns in need of depot -level maintenance 
currently are sent to LEAD, who forwards them to FNMI via an IMMC -FNMI contract.  
The Avenger crew currently receives little or no technical information from LEAD for 
M3P issues and LEAD does not serve as a conduit to FNMI for direct support 
information.  This leads to the conclusion that the Avenger systems would receive depot -
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level support more directly  under a PVS contract and the crewmen and repairmen would 
have improved access to the source of technical information.   
2. Conclusion Two 
A PVS support concept for the M3P should include the direct ordering of spare 
parts from the prime contractor.  The c urrent supply system provides less-than-desirable 
service and speed of delivery in support of the M3P.  The inventory of spare parts at DLA 
appears to be too large for the number of M3Ps in service.  Over time, a PVS contract 
would drive that excess inventory down to a minimum, reducing cost and space.  The 
M3P machine gun system contains less than 200 individual parts, making it a very 
manageable project for a PVS support concept. 
3. Conclusion Three    
A PVS contract could improve the training and deployment readiness of the M3P 
by having access to the prime contractor's knowledge and expertise.  The Avenger units 
train once or twice each year, culminating in a combined live-fire for both the missile 
system and the machine gun.  The successful firing of the M3P on the training range (gun 
fires at the specified rate with no stoppages) would better prepare the Avenger crew for 
the battle area.     
4. Conclusion Four 
It is the conclusion of this thesis that a PVS concept should be investigated, 
implemented, and evaluated for the Avenger M3P machine gun system.  PVS 
implementation could improve the performance of the machine gun system, reduce the 
cost, reduce the spare parts inventory, and improve the soldier’s and the Marine’s 
confidence in the M3P.    
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are suggested to begin implementation of a PVS 
program for the Avenger M3P machine gun.  These recommendations also apply to any 
other program considering PVS for all or part of their program.  
1. Recommendation One 
Establish baseline costs and performance metrics of the current M3P support 
system.  If a new support system is to be implemented, there needs to be a method for 
predicting the savings and evaluating the results.  The PM should establish an IPT to 
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measure the support performance in the areas that will be affected by a PVS contract.  
The metrics must be quantifiable, easily measured, and not easily subject to 
manipulation.   
2. Recommendation Two 
Contact the R-TOC Pilot Program representatives for more information, 
suggestions, lessons -learned, and best practices that may apply to the M3P.  Attend the 
open pilot program forums and establish a relationship with programs that may have a 
similar PVS structure.  
3. Recommendation Three  
Initiate an IPT with the user and FNH/FNMI to discuss a PVS contract.  The IPT 
should be tasked to outline a structure that includes technical support, spare parts, 
shipping, manuals, a website, contact teams, training, battle area support, depot support, 
warehousing, and contract administration.  The focus of the IPT is to identify the scope of 
the support, taking into account the requirements of the contractor and the customer.  
After a common understanding of the scope, the contractor should be able to estimate the 
cost for a PVS contract. 
4. Recommendation Four 
Design a small-scale pilot program to test a PVS contract for the M3P.  Select one 
or two units that would agree to be a test case, then implement and measure the results.  
Data and feedback from the user and the contractor could be used to adjust the program 
before a worldwide implementation.   
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
· Follow-up study on the progress of the R-TOC Pilot Programs and the 
development of a combined lessons -learned document.  These initiatives 
have been established to reduce the pilot program's total ownership costs 
and will be a valuable resource for programs considering a PVS support 
concept. 
· An in-depth study of tools that are available for the measurement of 
logistics performance.  The study shou ld focus on measurement tools that 
are deficient or non-existent, and make recommendations for the 
development of special measurement and assessment tools.  
· A study of the funding issues associated with long-term O&S contracts.  
The R-TOC programs have identified funding regulations and regulatory 
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APPENDIX.  EXPLODED DIAGRAM OF THE M3P 
TM 10152A-24&P - 4 P
3-6
Figure 3-1.  Machine Gun Major Components
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Figure 3-2.  Bolt Assembly
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TM 10152A-24&P - 4&P
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Figure 3-3.  Extractor Assembly
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Figure 3-4.  Feed Cover Assembly
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Figure 3-5.  Regulator and Backplate Assembly
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Figure 3-6.  Barrel Buffer Assembly
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Figure 3-7.  Barrel and Barrel Extension Assembly
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